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A Critical Note 
Nicholas Tonti-Filippini 
The author is the director of the Bioethics Department at St. Vincent's 
Hospital, Fitzroy, Australia. His in-depth book review is being presented 
here as an article. 
1. Establishing Ontological Individuality 
In his recent book, When did I begin? Conception of the human 
individual in history, philosophy and science, Cambridge University 
Press, Father Norman Ford argues that human ontological individuality 
could not be achieved at fertilization and that a human person begins 
about two weeks later, "when a living individual human body is actually 
formed with the active potential to develop further without change in 
ontological identity". In this critical note, I argue that Father Ford has, in 
fact, demanded more of the early embryo than he would of an adult human 
individual. In other words, logically his exclusion of the early embryo 
would also exclude a normal adult human individual. I argue that 
twinning no more affects the ontological identity of the early embryo than 
does the possibility of my being cloned or of my becoming a parent affect 
my identity. Further, logically he must also hold that amoeba, trees and 
any other organisms which reproduce asexually cannot be held to be 
ontological identities persisting through time and space as the same 
individuals. 
The crux of Father Ford's argument is the matter of defining ontological 
individuality and applying that definition to the embryological evidence 
and the theories based upon it. Principally, he claims that it is impossible 
for ontological individuality and, hence, personhood to have been 
achieved until after the stage is reached at which identical twinning is no 
longer possible. Identical twinning is the process in which the cluster of 
cells which constitute the early embryo are thought to divide to form two 
individuals. Identical twins share the same genetic inheritance and hence 
are not genetically unique. 
The book begins with a discussion of the method to be used, then 
follows with a section on the historical influences focusing on Aristotle, 
Aquinas and Catholic teaching. The historical section seems to have been 
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included in order to show that the author's support for a theory of delayed 
animation is consistent with an older Catholic tradition founded upon 
Aristotelian understanding of reproduction and an erroneous embryology. 
The author's point would seem to be to show the influence of biology on the 
philosophical principles i·n order to prepare the ground for asserting that a 
close examination of recent embryological conclusions would tend, once 
again, to move the philosophical principles toward a concept of delayed 
animation. 
In chapter three, from a discussion of criteria for being a human 
individual, the first part of the author's thesis emerges, that answering the 
question "When did I begin?" It is a matter of determining "when a distinct 
living individual is first formed that has the natural active potential to begin 
the continous process of developing itself into an adult human individual 
while retaining throughout its own ontological identity as a living 
individual". (p. 100) The following sections then examine successive stages 
of the early development of a human embryo in order to determine the 
earliest stage at which ontological individuality is achieved. 
Father Ford distinguishes between "a personalist understanding of the 
human individual" and "a metaphysical understanding of the human 
individual". He explains a personalist understanding in terms of that which 
we, ordinary persons, understand through our experience of ourselves 
-unique in the sense of being distinct from other persons and things, social 
by nature, we are ourselves distinct from having those things that are not 
part of ourselves, we have and are a body at the same time, we are moral 
agents, and we are the subject of conscious states and experiences. 
He asserts that, as well as understanding what it is to subjectively 
experience being a human individual, we must also consider human 
individuality from an objective point of view which he refers to as a 
metaphysical understanding. In this context, he seeks to give an account of 
the essential unity of ourselves which we experience as personal subjects. 
Here Father Ford appeals to the Aristotelian hylomorphic theory of matter 
and form of which he had previously given an account. He argues that the 
soul or life principle is the form of the body, thus matter and soul 
are principles of being, not things themselves that exist separately prior to the 
coming into existence of the human individual. (p. 73) 
In fact, the human individual exists by virtue of the matter and soul related to 
each other as potency and actuality within the unity of a single being or entity. This 
hylomorphic account of the constitution of the human individual adequately 
explains the dual polarity of the human person as the subject of activities and 
predicates that are predominantly corporeal or non-corporeal. The soul is one 
with the body, forming, determining, actuating and organizing the matter to be a 
human body, including all its tissues, organs, limbs and sexuality. The body is the 
subject of all our conscious activities and shares in the unique sense of dignity and 
value of the human being in every way. This represents a metaphysical explanation 
of the human nature of each person, where soul and matter constitute a single 
ontological individual (p. 73) 
... a non-material life-principle or soul is required in a human being to function 
as an ordinary form to account for the psychosomatic unity of the one subject of all 
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human activities. It is no surprise to find the human individual referred to as 'an 
incarnated spirit', 'an embodied soul' or 'an animated body'. (p. 75) 
Father Ford argues for the continuity of that unity through time from 
infancy to adulthood, through sleeping and waking states and so on; as 
such we recognize the existence of an identity which is not capable of 
experiencing self-conscious, rational and free acts in addition to 
performing nutritive and physiological functions and other bodily 
activities . He asserts that the growth of one individual into another: "the 
same ontological reality, the same identical being continues in existence 
throughout growth." (p. 78) 
. .. It is understood that the infant has inherent natural active capacity to develop 
to the stage of being able to exercise self-conscious and rational acts while 
retaining the same ontological identity as a human individual. We can simply and 
truly sum things up by saying that a person is a living individual with a truly 
human nature. i.e. a human individual. a human being. An infant is a person 
already because its nature enables it to develop to the age of reason without loss of 
ontological identity. (p. 77) 
Father Ford then extends this claim to include the unborn - provided that 
an ontological identity has been established in the first place. 
Nominalist Style 
Throughout his discussion of human identity, the author's style tends to 
be nominalist, doing little more than stating positions, indicating those 
with which he is in agreement and providing little argument for the 
positions held. There is a marked lack of discussion of the more recent 
analyses of identity theory. To some extent this would explain the author's 
myopia when it comes to considering the possibility of identity persisting 
in an individual who has been replicated. As we shall see, the author's 
thesis eventually emerges as the claim that the same ontological identity 
cannot persist if the individual is capable of replication. 
Beginning his section on criteria for the presence of a human individual, 
Father Ford defines the human person in the following way: 
We can say the human person is a living individual with a human nature, i.e ., a 
living ontological individ ual that has within itself the active capacity to maintain, 
or, at least to begin, the process of the human life-cycle without loss of identity .. . . 
In other words , a human person begins as a living individual with the inherent 
active potential to develop towards human adulthood without ceasing to be the 
same ontological individual. (p. 85) 
At this point Father Ford's account is not greatly different from the 
account given by St. Vincent's Bioethics Centre in its various submissions 
on the issue of embryo experimentation: 
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. .. there are concrete individual living beings as well as life in general, and that 
each of these has a definite beginning at a more or less identifiable time, when 
there occurs a notable event that sets this organized unity on its way of 
development. 
Linacre Quarterly 
Now, when this event has taken place and a new centrally organized unity has 
been established, quite distinct from the organization of the preceding sperm or 
egg or mother cell [in the case of asexual reproduction], the genetic code of this 
new individual has been determined and a whole set of very remarkable capacities 
has been established. Allowing for the normal availability of nourishment and a 
non-hostile environment, that progenitor cell already has the capacity for 
directing its own development in such a way that a brain is developed suitable for 
all those activities which we saw to be characteristic of human beings, the 
activities that persons can perform. The capacities for those activities already 
exist in the genetic material of the progenitor cell. I 
A crucial aspect of Father Ford's account, however, is that which he 
means by "the same ontological individual". Given the argument which he 
develops concerning twinning, it is worth pursuing an answer to the 
question: What, on Father Ford's account, is required for a human life to 
remain the same ontological individual from one stage to another? . 
He answers the question in part in the following way. 
There cannot be a human person present if the conditions required for the 
presence of an ontological individual cannot be satisfied. Individuation appears 
to be a basic criterion. (p. 85) 
Father Ford discusses the concept of an ontological individual and his 
conclusions might be summarized thus: An ontological individual is 
undivided in itself and distinct from others, one subject of existence, one 
whole being spread out in space, whose parts share in the existence of the 
whole individual but do not have a separate existence unless split from the 
whole, having its own specific heterogeneous structure and retaining its 
identity through time. (pp. 86-91) 
Concept of Living Ontological Individual 
Developing, then, the concept of a living ontological individual, Father 
Ford asserts the following, and it would be well to note what he says 
carefully here for it is very significant in relation to his conclusions, and 
can, I will argue, be shown to contradict his conclusion. (Please excuse the 
length of the excerpt, but it is an important passage to which I will be 
making extensive reference.) 
The same individual that begins life goes through its life-cycle. This involves 
individual, considerable changes in the quantity of the matter possessed by each 
individual at various stages of life. One's identity as a living ontological individual 
remains unchanged whenever one gains or loses weight. The same is true if one 
loses one or more limbs. One keeps one's own identity throughout several 
successful organ transplants. What is needed to remain the same ontological 
individual is to stay alive, sustained by the functioning of one's vital organs all the 
time. It is the form that actuates the matter to make it be a living individual of a 
specific species. (Remember the soul acts as the form for the human individual.) 
The cells of one's body could be totally renewed over a period of six years without 
loss of one's individual ontological identity. As this gradually takes place; the new 
matter is integrated into the one existing living individual. 
It is the individual as a whole that exists primarily, not the single cells. The cells 
and organs share in the life and existence of the whole individual. They do not 
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exist separately or at least as distinct individuals themselves. (Exceptions do exist 
where some distinct individuals live within another living individual, e.g. sperm, 
ova, bacteria, viruses, the fetus in the mother's womb, the mother's protective 
white cells passed to the baby's gut during breast feeding.) The one living 
individual continues in existence throughout all the changes of its self-
development and growth. Matter from outside the organism can be taken in and 
assimilated by the process of nutrition to become one with the same living 
ontological individual. Inorganic individuals cannot do this and lose their 
ontological identity if their atomic composition is altered, as we have seen already 
in the case of atoms and molecules. It is clear that the living organism assimilates 
from within to grow as the same ontological individual. A living individual, 
however, should be understood analogously as eminently dynamic, fluid, and 
developmental, compared to its rigid inorganic counterpart." (pp. 93-4) 
3. Ontological Individuality, Twinning and Reproducing 
3.1 Fr. Ford's Summary Case for Fertilization 
I have little difficulty with the above explanation of the ontological 
identity of a living organism. At the same time I fail to see why an early 
human embryo does not fit this description. It seems that all that is said 
here applies to an embryo as soon as its capacities are established by the 
union of sperm and ovum. To quote Father Ford again: 
Once fertilization has taken place the human sperm and egg cease to exist as 
distinct entities. A genetically human, new living individual cell is formed, a 
zygote, that has the proximate potential to develop to a mature human person 
with the same genetic constitution. (p. 97) 
In this, he is in agreement with the Senate Select Committee on Human 
Embryo Experimentation, which concluded that the embryo is a 
"genetically new human life organised as a distinct entity oriented towards 
further development" .2 
Father Ford puts the case case for holding that human ontological 
individuality begins at fertilization. 
The unicellular zygote, with its specific heterogeneous quantitative parts 
characteristically arranged, seems to have the minimum mass of living matter 
required for the constitution of an ontological individual with a truly human 
nature. It is thought to be a human individual because it is assumed to have the 
natural capacity to develop to human adulthood without loss of its ontological 
individuality. In short, it is argued that from the completion of fertilization 
(syngamy) we. have a human being or person with potential, not a potential 
human person. It would appear the criteria for being a human individual 
established in the previous chapter point to this conclusion beyond reasonable 
doubt. The adult, then, would be the same personal being as the zygote from 
which it develops through cell multiplication, differentiation and growth. (p. III) 
3.2 The Case Against Fertilization 
3.2.1 Genetic and Ontological Individuality 
In his case against this position, however, Father Ford cautions against 
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confusing genetic individuality and ontological individuality. 
The genetic code in the zygote does not suffice to constitute or define a human 
individual in an ontological sense. Identical twins have the same genetic code but 
are distinct ontological individuals. (p. 117) 
Immediately following this point, Father Ford makes a curious aside in 
relation to chorionic biopsy, saying that the extra-embryonic membrane 
tissue of the chorion has a genetic constitution which is identical to that of 
the fetus, but that one could scarcely argue that the subject of the biopsy 
was the human individual rather than the chorionic tissue that has no 
nerves. 
Seemingly Extraordinary 
This seems to be an extraordinary observation. Nowhere has Father 
Ford shown that the parts of an individual must be connected by or have 
nerves. He does not at any stage explain concepts such as integration and 
organization by which the point might be shown to be relevant. In any 
case, there would seem to be no reason for holding that the chorion is not a 
part of the embryo, a part which will eventually be discarded in the same 
way that one discards milk teeth, hair, etc. In fact Father Ford has already 
covered this possibility in the long section quoted above when he referred 
to loss of weight, loss oflimbs, organ transplants, renewal of cells, etc. It is 
the form which actuates matter that is significant, the individual as a 
whole, not individual cells or organs. 
From the scientific conclusion that the embryonic genome is only 
switched on at a stage after the stage of the formation of the first cell, 
Father Ford argues to the conclusion that 
... despite the zygote's genetic identity with the future adult, despite the fact that 
it is itself a living ontological individual, it should only be regarded as a potential 
human individual, not an actual human individual in an ontological sense. Unless 
the blueprint of the DNA in the zygote's genotype is activated, it is practically a 
'dead letter' and could not be considered a true human individual even if it does 
produce genetically identical progeny up to the two-or four-cell stage before 
degenerating. 
I 
The issue which Father Ford would seem to have failed to address is that 
the switching-on of the embryonic genome occurs from within the zygote 
itself. That is to say, the zygote at the first cell stage does not require some 
external event to switch it on, so to speak, but already contains its own 
programming, such that it directs its own activity and eventual replication 
and differentiation in its growth toward human adulthood, provided it is 
given a favorable environment. 
Father Ford's seemingly valid distinction between genetic and onto-
logical individuality establishes nothing other than the obvious conclusion 
that genetic uniqueness or individuality is neither sufficient nor necessary to 
establish ontological individuality. The issue of the switching of the 
embryonic genome would seem to be irrelevant to the main argument. 
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3.2.2 Identical Twinning in the Zygote 
Whatever the cause of monozygotic twinning [whether from external causes or 
from some inherent capacity] in the zygote at the two-cell stage, the fact that it 
cleaves into two individual blastomeres that may develop separately as identical 
twins does not mean the zygote itself is not a true ontological individual. We 
know it is a living ontological individual. But once it divides mitotically into two 
separate twin daughter blastomeres, it apparently ceases to exist and loses its 
ontological individuality to give rise to two new genetically identical, but distinct 
living ontological individuals within the zona pellucida. This contains, protects 
and holds them together during their early development. The continuity of the 
same ontological individual ceases when the zygote forms twins. The zygote is not 
the same ontological individual as either one of the eventual twins that result 
from its development, notwithstanding its genetic identity continuing throughout 
all its subsequent cleavages. (p. 119) 
Father Ford applies this logic not only to zygotes which do in fact form 
an identical twin, but to all zygotes "insofar as they all have the natural 
active potential to form identical twins that may develop into adults, given 
suitable conditions". (p. 120) That a zygote is capable of forming a twin 
does not in itself establish a discontinuity between the zygote prior to the 
stage at which twinning is no longer possible and after that stage has been 
reached. 
While it may be the case that an amoeba, which reproduces itself 
asexually by division, dies or otherwise ceases to exist as the same 
ontological individual at the moment that it is replicated and instead 
becomes two new and distinct ontological individuals, this is not the 
normal way in which human beings are produced. Identical twinning 
occurs only in a small percentage of cases. One can either hold that in 
identical twinning the original individual dies and two new individuals 
come into existence, or that the one individual remains throughout, but 
that a new individual is reproduced in the same way that a tree may be 
replicated by taking a cutting. 3 In either case, the explanation does not 
establish a discontinuity in an individual who was never twinned and who 
has persisted as the same individual from the earliest stage at which he or 
she was a zygote. The latter describes the majority of human individuals. 
For the majority of human individuals, the answer to the question "When 
Did I Begin?" is not "when I lost the ability to form an identical twin". That 
I might have formed identical twins (but did not) and in the process have 
ceased to exist, does not alter the case that as an individual who was not 
twinned, I began as a possibly twinnable but nevertheless individual 
zygote. 
Further, that it may be possible for an individual to be reproduced 
asexually does not mean that that individual is not an individual persisting 
through time and space as the same living individual. It is not beyond the 
stretches of imagination to consider the possibility that some diligent 
scientist may discover a means of human cloning. There are several 
possibilities for this. One way in which this might be achieved would be for 
the scientist to replace the genetic material in an embryo with the genetic 
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material from an ordinary somatic cell and the transfer of the clone to a 
woman's uterus where it would develop as the biological replica of the 
individual whose genetic material was used. 
Additional Alternative 
A second alternative would be to find some means of adding to an 
ordinary somatic cell that which would be required to make it behave as an 
embryonic cell. Thus it may be possible for a scientist to take an ordinary 
somatic cell and by reversing the effects of differentiation, etc ., restore 
totipotency. In that way, one might be able to reproduce asexually. 
A third alternative and one which is a little far-fetched but nonetheless 
discussed by philosophers considering identity theory, is that of creating 
an exact replica of every cell in a human body by means of an extra-
ordinary advanced form of computer which is able both to scan every cell 
and then replicate it from the raw materials, and to do all this in an instant! 
In each of these cases of cloning, the original identity suffers no signifi-
cant change. In the first and second cases a single cell is lost. In the third 
case, there is no direct effect on the individual. The ontological identity of 
the individual would seem to be unchanged by the individual having been 
replicated. There seems to be no reason for holding that an ontological 
identity cannot persist in spite of the individual forming a replica. 
Father Ford raises the concern that if one holds that a zygote's 
ontological identity persists in one of the identical twins formed , that an 
insoluble problem is created in determining which was the original zygote. 
There would be a problem of identical indiscernibles. (p. 122) 
The latter is, however, no help to his argument. That we are not able to 
discern which was the original and which its identical twin, does not mean 
that therefore neither is the original. Further, it may well prove to be the 
case that the twin embryos retain a memory, so to speak, or record of 
replication, such that the original carries data relating to its having been 
replicated and then losing the replicated cell(s), or alternatively, that the 
first cell of the identical twin carries the data of not having arisen from the 
fusing of two gametes, but rather from the replication of an already 
completed progenitor cell. One needs to bear in mind that there is much 
more to a cell than just the genetic material in the nucleus and that the 
simple explanation of twinning merely in terms of the replication and 
division of the cells ignores all the complex processes which must occur 
within the various membranes and the organelles of the cells for both life to 
continue and twinning to occur. 
Recall Father Ford's analysis (in the long passage above) of a living 
ontological individual in which he asserted that the same individual 
persists through changes in quantity of matter, loss oflimbs, organs, cells, 
etc. Is this not all that happens to the original cell which develops an 
identical twin? Is it not the case that all that has happened to it is that it has 
been replicated and a cell or quantity of replicated cells has become 
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separated to form a new individual? 
As an implication of Father Ford's account, one would be led to 
conclude that any individual who has the capacity to reproduce asexually 
is not one individual but potentially many individuals. For his twinning 
argument to succeed, he must maintain a metaphysical distinction between 
asexual reproduction and that which normally occurs in humans, namely 
sexual reproduction, and he must maintain the impossibility of asexual 
human reproduction through some form of cloning. The day that a 
scientist demonstrates that he could clone Father Ford will be the day that 
Father Ford ceases to be an individual on his account, for potentially he 
would be many individuals. 
A point of great interest would be to discover just how Father Ford 
would account for the continuity of ontological identity through the 
process of sexual parenting. 
He mentions this issue briefly, partly accounting for it in the following 
way. 
We could also recall the example of a human person producing individual live 
sperm or ova. In these instances there would be one live individual retaining its 
ontological individuality while it gives origin to another live individual (plant, 
sperm or ovum). Hence in theory, it would appear that a zygote could retain its 
individuality and personal identity when cleaving to produce another human 
individual identical to itself. Put this way, it would appear that, theoretically, 
identical twinning itself need not necessarily be incompatible with the zygote 
being a human individual from the completion of fertilization. 
However, human individuals do not resemble plants in this respect. It seems 
that the analogy used to avoid the dilemma does not apply. The case of an 
amoeba or a bacterial cell becoming two by fission would be the appropriate 
analogy to apply in the case of identical twinning in human zygotes. (p. 121) 
Why does this amoeba analogy not apply to the case of producing 
human sperm also? Why does he not attempt to establish a metaphysical 
distinction between human sperm or ova production and the reproduction 
of an amoeba from a parent amoeba? In both cases is the ontological 
identity of the parent not maintained? 
There is nothing in Father Ford's argument to show why it is that in 
producing sperm and ovum (both ontological individuals on his account) 
and subsequently a new individual through the fusion of the two, a normal 
human couple do not also lose their identity in their two identities 
eventually becoming three. Father Ford simply provides no argument for 
showing that twinning necessarily involves the loss of identity of the 
individual who continues development from the original cell. Further, he 
provides no argument to show that the problem he has with identity in the 
twinning case does not also apply to every form of reproduction of an 
individ ual. 
In no way has he refuted the passage he quotes from the evidence 
submitted to the Australian Senate Select Committee on Human Embryo 
Experimentation by Rev. Tom Daly, S. 1. 
44 Linacre Quarterly 
There is nothing philosophically troublesome about one organized whole 
developing within it another circle of organization which eventually breaks off 
from it while the original individual retains its identity. One living thing has given 
rise to another and this can happen in a wide variety of ways, most of which are 
quite familiar, though so many writers on the embryo assume that this would 
destroy all previous individuality. The twinning that they see as an insuperable 
obstacle to previous establishment of identity is no more difficult to explain than 
is the vegetative propagation of a plant by removing a bulb, or by taking a cutting. 
An amoeba is no less of a real concrete individual thing if later on it reproduces 
and initiates a new amoeba by fission . Indeed the same applies for sexual 
reproduction. If we were to take seriously the line of argument of Diamond, 
Edwards and the like, we would have to deny that a man or a woman had ever 
been an individual once we found that he or she had produced a child . (p. 113) 
3.2.3 The Potency of the Zygote 
Father Ford's third argument against fertilization being the beginning 
of the life of a human individual would seem to depend on the fact that the 
zygote is not differentiated and that as well as being able to twin, it also has 
the potential to develop extraembryonic tissues. 
The zygote has the potential both to produce cells that will form 
extraembryonic structures that are not strictly constitutive parts of the future 
definitive embryo proper and fetus and other cells that will only form structures 
of the definitive embryo proper and fetus. Prior to this differentiation all the cells 
can give rise to both embryonic and extraembryonic structures. It is this 
indeterminate state of the zygote both in relation to the differentiation required 
for the formation of the definitive embryo proper and the number of definitive 
embryos to be formed that suggests the zygote itself is only potentially a human 
individual, but not yet an actual human individual. (p. 124) 
The fact that the zygote forms the so-called "extraembryonic structures" 
as well as the so-called "embryo proper" seems in no way to diminish its 
individuality. Those structures and their eventual separateness from the 
embryo itself are no more of a problem to individuality than the shedding 
of milk teeth and the replacement or displacement of other cells in the 
human body such as skin, hair, skeleton, etc. As Father Ford himself 
claims in defining living ontological individuality, 
It is the individual as a whole that exists primarily, not the single cells. The cells 
and organs share in the life and existence of the whole individual. They do not 
exist separately or at least as distinct individuals in themselves. (p. 93) 
The extraembryonic tissues are, for a time, part of the zygote as one's 
organs and cells are part of one's body. Later they are discarded and 
become distinct from the individual, but without affecting the 
individuality of that individual. I fail to see why Father Ford should have 
seen this as a difficulty; in fact his own analysis of living ontological 
individuality (pp. 93-4) would seem to have accounted for this 
phenomenon. In particular, his adoption ofhylomorphism would seem to 
supply a simple explanation of the form actuating matter, thus 
constituting a unity in which cells and organs may be added or subtracted 
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without changing the overall assimilation and organization of all the parts 
at any given instant. 
The placenta is simply an organ of the fetus needed by it until birth and 
then discarded. Discarding the placenta in no way affects the individuality 
of the fetus. Similarly, the fact that within the overall organization and the 
actuation by the same form, the original cell may finish up being discarded 
as part of the placenta or any of the other "extraembryonic structures" in 
no way diminishes the individuality of the original cell at the stage when it 
alone constituted the zygote. 
3.2.4 The Life Process of a Zygote 
In this section Father Ford seems to be concerned to debunk the claim 
that a life process is begun in the formation of the zygote and continues 
through to the development of the adult until its death. 
Firstly, he asserts that an individual is not a process nor can it be reduced 
to a process. This seems to be consistent with his metaphysics. There must 
be an individual within whom and to whom the process occurs and it must 
remain the same individual throughout for the adult who eventuates to 
have begun as that individual. 
Father Ford then proceeds to assert once more the twinning argument 
in relation to life processes. That is to say, he argues that the life process of 
the zygote may give rise to the distinct life processes of two or more distinct 
individuals, etc. There seems to be little more to this than was already 
discussed in relation to twinning. 
The response to it, therefore, can be along the same lines. In the zygote, a 
new life process is started as a continuity from the life process of its 
parents, yet distinct in that it inheres in a new and distinct individual. If 
that individual should form an identical twin, then on one explanation a 
new individual forms and the original continues after a cutting is removed 
and planted. On the other explanation, the individual ceases to be and two 
new individuals are formed. In either case, new individuals or a new 
individual come(s) into existence, inheriting the life processes of the 
parent(s), but as individuals being distinct. 
3.2.5 Having a Human Nature 
In this section Father Ford argues that the zygote has a human nature, 
but that this is distinct from the question of individuality. Again he uses the 
twinning argument to make this point. 
3.3 Father Ford's Conclusions to this Section 
Father Ford asserts that the human individual does not begin at the 
zygote stage, but at some later stage, and that the evidence "seems 
insufficient to warrant dra wing any conclusions beyond that of the zygote 
being one or more human individuals, in potency." (p . 131) 
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The argument of this section would seem to be well-represented by the 
following: 
. .. One should not postulate the presence of a spiritual soul informing or 
animating the body, before one is assured of the actual presence of an ontological 
individual that is a person by reason of its complete human nature. 
The dual principles of spiritual soul (form) and matter, or more simply mind 
and body, are introduced to explain adequately the unity and functioning of the 
human person, understood as a primitive and underived datum of our 
experience. They do not pre-exist the human person, as though they come 
together to form the human being. They begin to exist as constitutive co-
principles of a person only when the ontological individual human being is 
actually present. It is difficult to see how this could be so before the actual 
formation of a truly multicellular individual living body. Its specific 
heterogeneous quantitative parts would be needed for the activities required for 
orderly self-development, self-maintenance, self-differentiation and growth. 
(p. 130) , 
In making this statement, Father Ford seems to have forgotten that the 
zygote has all the organizational data present for its self-development, 
self-maintenance, self-differentiation and growth. Nothing more is added 
in the unfolding of its life cycle other than the provision of nourishment 
and a favorable environment. The zygote is so organized as to be 
developing toward human adulthood and must therefore have whatever it 
is in the way ofform to have that organization, dynamism and integration 
within the first cell, such that a human adult can result without any further 
addition of anything other than the nourishment which it assimilates into 
itself. The multi-cellular individual to which Father Ford refers was 
programmed to develop as a subsequent stage from the progenitor cell; to 
postulate anything else is to believe in magic!4lfthat individual who began 
as that original cell should be capable of forming an identical twin, then 
that possibility is no more metaphysically significant to its individuality 
than any individual's ability to parent by sexual or asexual means. 
Father Ford's thesis is not well-founded. From the point of view of the 
metaphysical position which he outlines in Chapter 3, it would seem that 
the respect due to a human being should commence from the moment 
when the formation of a human zygote is begun. 
The zygote is the new celt normally formed by the release of the contents 
of the head of a single sperm through the inner membrane of an ovum. The 
morally relevant feature is the coming into existence of an individual cell 
which has the complete and dynamic organization to be the kind of being 
which has commenced development toward human adulthood and thus 
has the capacities which we distinguish as being human.' 
4. The Serious Consequences of Father Ford's Thesis 
Father Ford's argument is not simply a matter of academic interest: a 
consequence of his conclusion is to alter the moral status of a decision to 
terminate a human life at an early stage (during the period between 
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fertilization and the formation of the primitive streak at about two weeks), 
from that of abortion to that of contraception. In either case the morality is 
that of the rejection of the divine gift of a human life and, according to 
Catholic teaching, would in itself be gravely wrong. However, the morality 
in each case is of a different order and in particular applications the 
difference has practical consequence. 
Father Ford's thesis has a direct bearing on the now traditional thinking 
in relation to the victims of rape, that contraceptive measures as a form of 
self-defense against the aggression are legitimate. 
In short, the wrongfulness of contraception (in the morally relevant sense of the 
word 'contraception') has to do with the character of the double choice it 
involves: both to bring oneself into an intimate bodily relationship of sexual 
communion with another human being and positively to exclude the 
transmission of new life that might otherwise complete their relationship. There is 
no such double choice in the use of conception prevention agents or procedures 
after a sexual assault . The woman has made no choice of sexual communion, and 
so her choice can now be directed to putting an end to continuing invasion of her 
body, and need not be a choice to repudiate the good of procreation-by-sexual 
communion." 
By implication, Father Ford's thesis would seem to extend that 
exception to use of abortifacients in the first two weeks after the possible 
occurrence of fertilization following rape. Father Ford reportedly 
acknowledged this consequence of his position in an interview with a 
journalist who wrote: 
It was difficult for me, at times to follow his extremely refined reasoning. For 
instance, he concedes that it is immoral to abort a human fetus at any stage, or even 
frustrate the procreative destiny of a conjugal act. Then he says that a woman who 
has an early abortion, say after rape, should not be made to feel guilty of homicide, 
if a human person is not yet present. This also applies even to an early abortion 
procured to remove the result of a night's voluntary indiscretion.? 
A second consequence of Father Ford's thesis concerns the fact that 
western society, in general, has accepted 'the use of contraceptives as a 
legitimate and even obligatory means of achieving responsible parenthood, 
while abortion has not received the same measure of acceptance. Thus it iSo 
considered reasonable to debate whether or not performing an abortion 
should be a criminal offense, but in this culture one would find it very 
difficult to advance the suggestion that the provision of contraceptives 
should be prohibited. 
Within Catholic teaching a distinction is made between abortion and 
contraception; the latter is "gravely illicit" but the former is "a crime". The 
distinction is reasonable given that contraception is an act which is 
destructive of the meaning of the conjugal act, but abortion is an act which 
is destructive of a human individual. Both are seriously wrong but the one 
is more serious than the other. 
By shifting the destruction of a human life in the first two weeks from the 
category of abortion to the category of contraception, Father Ford's thesis 
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would thus tend to weaken the case for prohibiting destructive, non-
therapeutic research on human embryos in the first two weeks, and the 
case against the inclusion of the new abortifacient RU486 within the 
pharmacopoeia as a legitimate therapy. The publication ofthe book is thus 
an extremely serious matter in the context of the Church's mission in 
defense of human rights and the institution of marriage and the family. In a 
very important area, the defense of "the fruit of human generation, from 
the first moment of its existence", Father Ford's book appears to 
undermine much of the work which has been done by those who have 
sought to have the teaching of Christ and of His Church inform those 
responsible for public policy in this important area. 
Whatever the merit of Father Ford's argument in relation to the 
attainment of personhood and ensoulment, recent Catholic teaching, 
while it acknowledges that there is scope for philosophical discussion and 
reflection on these points, holds that 
... the fruit of human generation, from the first moment of its existence, that is to 
say from the moment the zygote has formed, demands the unconditional respect 
that is morally due to the human being in his bodily and spiritual totality. The 
human being is to be respected and treated as a person from the moment of 
conception; and therefore from that same moment his rights as a person must be 
recognized, among which in the first place is the inviolable right of every innocent 
human being to life. 
In Donum Vitae, it was not decided that the Church should teach 
conclusively that a human life, from the first moment of its existence, has 
an immortal soul and is a person, but nevertheless it was held that the 
Church teaches that it is to be respected and treated as a person. The extent 
to which the publication of Father Ford's book and the continuing 
publicity undermine that respect is thus of serious consequence. , 
It is not true to say that Father Ford's thesis is in conflict with Catholic 
teaching as the latter is expressed in Donum Vitae. However, one would be 
in conflict with Catholic teaching were one to give moral advice premised 
upon his thesis or to use his thesis to assert that protection of human life in 
the first two weeks should be withheld or in any way diminished. Catholics 
ought to be made a ware also that in a recent interpretation of the Catholic 
Church's Code of Canon Law (Osservatore Romano, Dec. 5), the term 
"abortion" was clarified such that the term embraces any deliberately 
terminative action posited against a fetus in any way whatsoever and at 
any time whatsoever from the moment of conception. 
The effect on public policy of the publication of Father Ford's thesis as 
the thinking of an eminent Catholic priest is thus to undermine Catholic 
teaching. The matter thus troubles many who are faithful to the teaching of 
the Church. 
However, Father Ford has used legitimate means to publish a 
philosophical argument in the expressed hope that in the ensuing 
discussion truth will emerge. The challenge is therefore to respond to his 
arguments, not on the issue of what the Church does or does not teach, nor 
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on the issue of the wisdom of publishing the book, but on the philosophical 
and embryological issues raised in the book. Careful and honest reflection 
on the issue can only tend to strengthen and deepen understanding of the 
truth. 
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